CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES IN EMINENT DOMAIN
IN PENNSYLVANIA.*
CONSTRUCTION OF A SEWER IN A STREET.

The construction of a sewer in a street or road is not an

exercise of the power of eminent domain, as there is no taking
of private property. Such construction is, however, well within
the scope of the public use of a highway. 4 ' The damage if any
caused to abutting property in this case was not the subject of
redress before the Constitution of 1874 in the absence of statu1 47
tory provision.
A municipal corporation constructing a sewer is, however,
a corporation exercising the power of eminent domain, but is
not exercising the power of eminent domain by the construction
in question. Such a corporation is clearly liable under the
constitution for "property taken, injured or destroyed by the
construction or enlargement" of a sewer, which is wel within
the definition of "works, highway or improvements.'1 4 ' The
remedy was formerly by action of trespass. The cases are as
follows:
In Butchers' Ice & Coal Co. v. Philadelphia,4 9 the plaintiff
recovered damages in an action of trespass for obstruction of
his wharf by reason of a sewer constructed by the City of Philadelphia under ordinance passed after 1874. The sewer was
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'"Wood v. McGrath, I5O Pa. 451 (1892); Carpenter v. Lancaster, 25oPa. 541 (1915). Where the sewer is constructed outside of the limits of
a highway across private property, as is sometimes the case, there is obviously a taking and to that extent an exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
..Malone v. City, 2 Penny. 3;0 (1882).
"Township authorities may construct sewers and assess the cost of
construction under tht proi-isions of the Act of Feb. 23, x9o5, P. L 22. In
Anderson v. Lower Merion Township, 217 Pa. 369 (1907), a bill in equity
by property owners- to restrain the collection of sewer assessments against

their properties was dismissed.
(256 Pa. 5A 0893).
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constructed entirely on the land of the city, which land had not
been acquired under the power of eminent domain. The mouth
o'f the sewer opened into a dock alongside of plaintiff's wharf
and the discharge from the sewer filled up the dock- and interfered with access to his property. It was held that the city
was clearly liable under Art. 16, Sec. 8, even though there
was no'question of negligence. The injury, it will be noted,
might have been avoided by the extension of the sewer beyond
the plaintiff's wharf line.'1
In Ladd v. Philadelphia,15 1 there was an action of trespass
to recover damages for injuries to a dwelling house caused by
the construction of a sewer.152 The plaintiff was allowed to
recover damages which were the direct and proximate result
of the construction of the sewer, irrespective of negligence. It
was argued in this case that the city was not liable because there
was no exercise of eminent domain in building the -sewer, and
that therefore Art. 16, Sec. 8, did not apply. The argument
was not even noticed in the opinion of the court, although it
must be confessed it has great force. Thq liability in such a
case is now provided for by the Act of May. i6, 1890.2
This case overrules decisions to the contrary prior to the Constitution
of 1874. See Malone v. City, 2 Penny. 370 (1882).
= 7 Pa. 485 (1895).
',Therewas an agreement of counsel in this case as to form of action.
Without this agreement it probably should have been brought under the
Act of May 16, 1891. P. L 75, which was in force at that. time.
I' P. I 7-. This act provides that viewers shall- be appointed who
shall assess damages and benefits and the cost of the sewer and also provides.
a method of collecting the cost by a lien on the property. The-remedy of
the property ownier is exclusively under this statute unless there is a devia-.
tion from the line described by the ordinance authorizing the construction
of the sewer, in which case, if the property owner petitions for viewers
he waives the tort and is entitled only to compensation. Garland Chain
Co. v. Rankin Boro., 226 Pa. 389 (1910). The property owner-is entitled
to the judgment of the viewers as to damages, benefits and the cost of the
sewer. Wheeler Ave. Sewer, 214 Pa. 504 (i9o6). As the Act of June 1,
1871, P. L 31. Sec- i. prohibiting the assessment of damages against
owners of property adjoining or in the vicinity of the land, appropriated
for public use, except in the case of roads, streets or highways, is not repealed by the Act of May i6, 1891, P. L. 75, the viewers appointed to assess
damages for property taken for a sewer cannot assess benefits generally
without regard to the cost of the sewer and exceptions to such a report
will be sustained. Mill Creek Sewer, i96 Pa. 183 (1900). No property
can be assessed for a sewer, except property abutting on the street in which
the sewer is constructed. Whitman v. Reading, 169 Pa. 375 (895); Park
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In Chathamn Strcet,'" proceedings were instituted under
the Act of May 16, x89i, 15 to assess damages and benefits for
injuries to property resulting from the construction of a sewer
in Chatham Street. The question involved in the case is as
to the measure of damages, and the court said that they were
to be assessed as of the date of the completion of the sewer.
Therefore no damages were recoverable in the proceedings for
neglect of a duty after the completion of the improvement. The
city argued in this case that the Act of May i6, i891,156 was
intended for and applied only to cases of exercise of the power
of eminent domain, and where the city rendered itself liable
outside of eminent domain, the remedy should be by trespass unless some other statutory remedy was provided. 157 The
argument did not prevail. The court said the damages were
such as were the direct, immediate and necessary consequences
of the construction of the sewer. It is to be noticed that this
argument is very much the same as that urged when it was
first sought to invoke the application of the provisions of Art.
16, Sec. 8, to the case of the construction of a sewer independently of any act of assembly.' 58
The construction of a sewer is an executive function 'conferred upon the local government by the legislature and not
subject to judicial review. Therefore, in the absence of negliAve. Sewers, 169 Pa. 433 (1895); Colwin Boro. v. Tarbottom, x9 Pa. Super.
Ct. 474 (1899). There is no recovery for the cost of reconstruction.

City of

Erie v. Russell. 148 Pa. 384 (1892) ; West Third St. Sewer, 187 Pa. 565 (x898).

The exemption in the charter of a cemetery company may be set up against

a municipal licn for sewer construction unless the exemption is clearly
repealed.

Uniondale Cemetery Co.'s Case, 227 Pa. i

(igio).

We have

noted only a few of the decisions under this statute for the purpose of more
clearly defining the main subject of discussion.
%'i6Pa. Super. Ct. 103 (oI).

'P. L. 7S
",P. L. 75.
Stork v. Phila., 195 Pa. io1 (igoo).
Fyfe v. Turtle Creek Borough, 22 Pa. Super. Ct. 292 (9D3)

'Citing.

where

the construction of the sewer deprived the owner abutting on the street
of lateral support. The court held that the effect of .the provision of
Article 16, Section 8, of the Constitution was to change the common law
rule as to lateral support in a case of this kind and impose a liability
for damages for the removal thereof.

The same rule was laid down as to

the measure of damages as in Chatham Street, 16 Pa. Super. Ct. io3 (19o1).
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gence, the city is not liable because the sewer is insufficient in
capacity to carry off surface water. The leading case on this
point is Bacr v. City of Allento, n, '59 where an abutting owner
brought trespass against the city under Art. 16, Sec. 8, to recover damages caused by water backing up on the street in front
of his premises caused by a sewer (which was constructed by the
city) being insufficient to carry it off. Reeder, P. J., in the
court below, said (affirmed on appeal), "In order to be entitled
to recover under the constitutional provision referred to, there
must be an actual and immediate depreciation in the value of the
property following immediately upon the construction complained of as to constitute a material injury to the value of the
property." The plaintiff did not complain that the construction
of the sewer depreciated the value of his property, but that the
city officials were guilty of an error of judgment, resulting in the
construction of an inadequate sewer by reason of which the water
was dammed back on plaintiff's property.1 60
The distinction between these cases is not apparent. If
property is damaged by flood from an inadequate sewer, there
is no right of recovery. If it is damaged by water flowing from
the sewer, the property owner can recover.

McCollum, J., in Butchers' Ice & Coal Co. v. Philadelphia,'81 distinguished the cases as follows:
"In the former the claims for damages were founded on the
alleged inadequacy of the sewers to carry off the surplus water
during heavy showers, and in the latter the claim rests on the uindisputed fact that access to the plaintiff's wharf was obstructed by
deposits of foul matter discharged through the sewer."
It is beside the case to say that in one case the plaintiff
claims depreciation in value and in the other claims damages
caused by an error of judgment. In each case there is an error
of judgment, and in each case depreciation. The true distinction
148 Pa. 8o (892).
'"This principle has been repeatedly affirmed since: Carr v. Northern
Liberties. 35 Pa. 324 (i86o); Sullivan v. Pittsburgh, 5 Pa. Super. Ct.
(1897): Collins v. Philadelphia, 93 Pa. 272 (i88o); Fair v. Philadelphia,
88 Pa. 309 (1879) ; Bealafeld v. Boro. of Verona, 188 Pa. 627' (1898). It
is perhaps surprising that so many cases have arisen on a point of law so
clearly ruled. It is probable, however, that in most of these cases the
plaintiff tried to prove negligence and failed.
a156 Pa. 54 (x893) at 58.
23

262

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

is, perhaps, to be found by applying the exact words of the constitution which confers a remedy for damages caused by the
construction or enlargement of the works. When the sewer is
inadequate, the damage results from the operation and is, therefore, not within the words of the constitution. The sewer after
it is constructed is too small to carry off the water, its operation is inadequate. In the other case, the sewer makes a deposit.
immediately after it is constructed, which deposit results immediately from the construction of the sewer and not from
the operation.
The provisions of the constitution, however, apparently do
not apply to a case where the work is done in the exercise of
16 2 - a suit was
the police power. In Betham v. Philadelphia,
brought against the city for damages caused by the negligent
construction of a sluice and dike. The court held that the city
was not under any statutory duty or power to build the sluice
except in so far as it could do so in the exercise of its general
police power. The power to construct the dikes in the case in
question had been vested in a private corporation by the Commonwealth by an act of assembly, which the court said the
Commonwealth had passed in the exercise of its police power.
The city could not do what it did except in the exercise of -the
sme power.
The same rule of law applies between a city and property
owner on the outskirts of a city as applies between two individual owners of land. The city in its position as an owner
of the city boundaries is entitled to the natural, profitable and
usual use of its land and is not liable to such property owner
for damages caused by an increased flow of surface water over,
or on to, his property arising merely from changes in the character of the surface caused by the opening of streets, building
of houses, etc., in the ordinary and regular course of the expansion of the city. ' "
,196 Pa. 3o2 (gio).
See obscure case of
SStrauss v. Allentown, 215 Pa. 96 (igo6).
Frederick v. Lansdale Borough. 156 Pa. 613 (1893), where the increased
flowage appears to have resulted directly. from the opcning of a street and
the right of the property owner to recover was sustained,
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In the case of negligence, the public authorities are liable

in an action of trespass.'"
A riparian owner may claim damages from the city for the
polluting of a stream by discharging contents of a sewer into it,
in which case the proper remedy is trespass.1 65 But the city is
not liable for alleged contamination of a well from the sewage
in the stream, because the connection between the discharge into
the stream and the contamination of the well is too remote. 12
THE LAYING OUT OF A STREET WITHOUT OPENING.

It frequently happens that public authorities will place a
street or road upon a public plan and then some interval of
time will elapse between the laying out and the opening.1 67 In
many of these cases, the property owner will be injured and
his property depreciated in value by the presence of the unopened street over his land. This injury is intensified by the
statutory provisions which prevent the owner from recovering
damages for the removal of buildings erected on the-ground
16
covered by the proposed street after it has been duly !aid out. 8
It seems perfectly clear, although there is no express. decision,
that before the Constitution of 1874, the damages in such case
'Negligence in failure to repair a sewer causing escape of sewage on
plaintiff's property. Betterly v. Scranton, 2o8 Pa. 370 (1904); Ansley v.
Scranton, 218 Pa. 113 (i9o7), question here as to plaintiff's contributory
negligence. Negligence in allowing obstructions to remain in sewer causbig overflow: defence that overflow was caused by an extraordinary
storm. Boehm v. Bethlehem Boro., 4 Pa. Super. Ct. 385 (1897). Negligent
construction of water pipe resulting in escape of water on plaintiff's
property. Borough, however, not liable for negligence of an independent
contractor. Gunther v. Boro. of Yorkville, 3 Pa. Super. Ct. 403 (1897).
Negligent construction of sewer inadequate to drain water shed resulting
in overflowing plaintiff's premises. Gift v. Reading, 3 Pa. Super. Ct. 359
(1897).
No reference to ConmCarpenter v. Lancaster, 212 Pa. 581 (z9o5).
stitution of 1874.
'"Wha-ton v. Bradford City, 209 Pa. 319 (1904).
win the case of South 12th Street, 217 Pa. 302 (19o7), forty years
elapsed between the laying out and the opening.
"'Act of Dec. 27. 187T. P. L. (1872) i8oo, applying to City of Philadelphia, and Act of May 16, i89i, P. L. 75, Sec. 12. of general application
throughout the state. The constitutionality of the Act of 1871 was affirmed
in the case of Harrison's Est., 25o Pa. 129 (igis), s. c. 23 D. R. 6o5.
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could not be recovered before the street was opened except under
16 9
the provisions of an act of assembly.
The question whether Article 16, Sec. 8, of the Constitution confers a right to recover damages for the mere laying
out has never been squarely decided.
In Bush v. McKeesport,"" a property owner in the city of
McKeesport petitioned for the appointment of viewers under
the Act of May 16, i89i,171 to a~sess damages caused by.a street
laid out over his property but not opened. The city filed an
answer setting out that the Act of i8g9 made no provision for
the recovery of damages for the mere laying out of a-street.
The court below entirely overlooked the issue raised by this
answer and dismissed the petition on the ground- that the mere*
laying out of the street on the city plan did not, under the law,
constitute such taking or injury as gave the court the power to
assess damages therefor. The Supreme Court, on appeal,
affirmed in a short and unsatisfactory per curiam opinion, on
the ground that the property of the petitioner had not been
taken or injured within the meaning of the provision of Art.
x6, Sec. 8, of Constitution of 1874.12 This is a curious deThere are several cases referred to in this connection which do not
exactly decide what they are commonly supposed to do, and to which
some attention should be given. In the District of the City of Pittsburgh,
2 W. & S. 32o (1841), the legislature had, by special act of assembly
directed certain land adjoining the City of Pittsburgh, to be surveyed
as a city district, and provided a method of laying out streets, ctc. Certain
of the inhabitantis objected to the map made in pursuance of the act on the
noted
ground that the act of assembly was unconstitutional. It is to be
and not
that this was a mere objection to the laying out of the street,
held, in
an attempt to recover damages for the same. The Supreme Court
the right to
an opinion by Kennedy. J., that the Constitution conferred
and
take property, that the laying out of the streets was not a taking,
the streets
that the act provided a method of assessing damages when
(187x), proceedings were
were actually opened. In Forbes St., 70 Pa. 125 which
had been laid out
taken to assess damages for a street opened
District of the
the
of
case
the
in
considered
assembly
of
act
the
under
for further
City of Pittsburgh. The Supreme Court sent the case back so
provides,
assembly
of
act
an
where
that
alia,
inter
saying.
proceedings,
to
entitled
not
is
opened,
is
street
a
which
through
propertv
the owner of
street
the
of
bed
the
in
erected
buildings
of
removal
for
recover damages
before the Constitution of
after it was laid out. As both these cases arose
i874 and under a special act of assembly, they are not in point.
"166 Pa. 57 (1895).
" P. L. 75.
'"This case was obviously hastily decided. The first section of the
U
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cision. Even if the constitutional provision did not extend to
such an injury, the legislature would undoubtedly have power

to impose liability by act of assembly, and the question was
squarely raised by the answer of the city whether such liability
was imposed by the Act of i891.172 " This the court entirely over-

looked. If the liability had been imposed by the act of assembly
in question, then any reference to the constitutional provision
was entirely out of place. If the act of assembly did not impose
a liability for damages caused by such injury, then any reference to the provisions of the constitution was in like manner,
out of place, because in the absence of statutory provision the
remedy of the property owner injured is by an act of trespass,
and the question whether the constitutional provision would extcnd to such a case would not be before the 'court for decision
until such an action in trespass was brought.
Strangely enough, the dictum of this case was accepted by
the profession, and no attempt was ever made squarely to raise
the question by bringing an action of trespass. The injustice
which frequently resulted to the property owner, particularly
in connection with the Parkway in Philadelphia, attracted attention, and the legislature attempted to confer a remedy against
cities, counties, boroughs and townships, by the Act of May
28, 1913.178
act authorizes municipalities to lay out, open, etc., a street and confers a
right to recover damages therefor. It is difficult to see how more appropriate language could be used to describe the injury inflicted by the plotting

of the street without opening.
IM P. L. 75.
'" P. L. 368. The text of the act is as follows:
Section i. Be is enacted, etc., That the right to damages against cities,
counties, boroughs, or townships, within this Commonwealth, is hereby
given to all owners or tenants of lands, property, or material abutting oh,
or through which pass, roads, streets, lanes, or alleys, injured by the laying
out, opening, widening, vacating, extending or grading of said roads,
streets, lanes or alleys, or the changing of grades or lines thereof, by said
cities. counties, boroughs or townships; the construction and the vacating

by said cities, counties, boroughs or townships of bridges, and the piers,
abutments, approaches, embankments. slopes, or causeways therefor, or
leading thereto; and the construction of sewers by said cities, counties,
boroughs, or townships in, over. upon, along, or through said lands,
property, or material.
Section 2. That all juries of view appointed, or which shall hereafter

be appointed, under existing laws, for assessing damages or benefits for
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No reported case has been found of an attempt to take
advantage of this act. The language is involved and obscure.
By the first section, the right to damages is apparently conferred
on the owners of the property through which passed a road, etc.,
injured by the laying out, etc., of said road. Does the word
"injured" refer to the road or to the owner of the property?
If a rqad must pass through the property before the property
owner is one of those contemplated by the act, how can he ever
recover for the laying out of the road? What the legislature
probably meant to say was something like this: Whenever any
road or alley is laid out, opened or widened, etc., by any city,
county, borough or township within the Commonwealth, any
owner or tenant of land and property, etc., abutting on said
road, etc., shall have a right to recover from any of said cities,
etc., damages caused by such laying out, opening, etc.
The second section of the act is also ambiguous. As it is
only a jury of view appointed under existing laws, who are
authorized and directed to assess the damages provided for in
section one, no damages can be recovered for the mere laying
out, except where there is already an act authorizing such a
recovery. If this is so, the statute does not add anything to
the existing law. Probably the most that can be said for the
act is that it directs any jury of view appointed to assess damtaking, using. occupying or injuring lands, property, or material, are hereby
directed, and it shall be their duty, to assess the damages provided for in
section one of this act, if any, against said cities, counties, boroughs, or
townships. as the case may be, and the benefits, if any, in connection therewith. and make report thereof as under existing laws.
Section 3. That the right of appeal to the proper court of common
picas from said report, and the right of trial by jury in said court of common
pleas, and the right to file exceptions to said report, are hereby given
to any party or parties not satisfied with said report, in accordance with
proceedings under existing laws.
Section 4. That after disposal of exceptions, or verdict and final judgment. any interested party or parties may have an appeal to the Superior
Court or-Supreme Court, as in any other cases.
Section 5. That the provisions of this act shall apply to all existing and
future proceedings.
Section 6. That all acts, or parts of acts, inconsistent herewith, are
hereby repealed.
Conifer. also. Act of June 7, irnI. P. L. 39g. providing that an ordinance
to open a park or parkway in cities of the first-class shall be considered
an actual appropriation of the land within a certain time after its passage..
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ages for the opening of a street, also to assess damages which
had been previously incurred by the mere laying out without
an opening.
In PhiladclphiaParkway, 174 an owner of property situate
within the lines of the Parkway as laid out by the city of Philadelphia petitioned the Court of Quarter Sessions for appointment of viewers to assess damages caused to his property""
The Parkway had not yet been actually opened nor had, apparently, any ordinance been passed authorizing the opening
over the property of the petitioner. The court below quashed
the petition, and, on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. The
city of Philadelphia is authorized to exercise the power of
eminent domain for the purpose of opening the Parkway by the
Act of June 8, 1907, 7 which provides that damages shall be

assessed as provided in the Act of June 8, 1$95.1' 7 By this
act the proceedings are in the Common Pleas. The. Supreme
Court decided 1 that this act did not repeal the previous legislation applying to the city of Philadelphia relating to the assessment of damages for the opening of streets, and vesting jurisdiction in the Court of Quarter Sessions. The property owner
may therefore proceed either in the Common Pleas under the Act
of June 8, 1895,119 or in the Quarter Sessions.

1: 250 Pa. 257 091x). reversing 24 D. R. 184 (19TS), where the court
dismissed the petition on the authority of In re South 12th St., 217 Pa.
362. In this case the street had been on the city plan for forty years before
the opening, after which proceedings to assess damages were instituted, in
which it was held, (x) that the damages were to be assessed with reference
to the market value of the land at the time of the opening, and not at the
time of the laying out. which latter was not a taking; (2) that no account
is to be taken of the circumstance that under the statutes no compensation
can be recovered for buildings erected on the bed of the proposed street
after the same had been plotted.
' The petitioner relied expressly on the Act of May 16, i pr, P. L.
75, which, however, did not authorize the proceedings because (a) it confers
jurisdiction only on the Common Pleas; (b) it does not apply to cases of
street openings in Philadelphia. In re Orthodox Street," g W. N; C. 411
(1892). This does not appear in the report but is set out in the petition
on file.
np L. 466.

hp. L 18&
Itln re .Opening of Parkway, 249 Pa. 367 (1915).

'P.

L. 18&

268

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW RE'IEF

The statutes in force relating to the opening of streets by

proceedings in the Quarter Sessions in Philadelphia, all clearly
provide that damages shall be assessed only where the street is
open or an ordinance to open is passed, and the acts have been
uniformly so construed.""" The court overlooked these statutes;
The Act of June 13,, 1836, P. L 556, as supplemented and
'* C)
amended by the Act of March 16, i8W0, P. L 2.4, which is the general road
law of the state, provides (in Sec. 7) that the owner of the land through
which the road is opened may within one year from the opening, petition
for damages. The one-year limitation was abrogated by Art. 3, Se. 2j.
of the Constitution of 1874. Grape St., 103 Pa. 121 (1883). The rest of
the provision, however, that the petition may not be presented untd the
road is open, is still in force, as it was before the Constitution of 1874.
Grugan v. Phila., 158 Pa. 337 (t893). The street was opened in x889 and
it was contended, inter alia, on behalf of the city, that the petitioner in
1,892 was barred by the statute of limitations because more than six years
had elapsed since the proceedings to lay out, in 1877. The contention was
overruled. See remarks of Sergeant, J., in Jarden v. Railroad Company,
3 Whart. 502 at 509 (1838), wherehe said that from the time of the laying
out of the street until the opening, the owner is left in the exclusive use
and accupancy of the land, and the public is not bound to pay for it until
actually occupied. Furthermore, the location of the road may be changed
and the land would then never be taken away from the owner and the
public might thus be required to pay for something which it might never
use. (2) The local
Act of April 21, x855, P. L 624, which provides that
councils may, by ordinance, order the opening of a street on the city plan
upon three months' notice, whereupon the owner whose ground will be
taken by such street may petition the Court of Quarter Sessions for
viewers to assess the damages which may be sustained by the opening. This
act, also, clearly confines the damages to be assessed under it to damages
caused by the opening of the street. In Phila. v. Dickson, 38 Pa. 247
(iS6x), an ordinance to open had been passed, the damages had been
assessed by the viewers under the Act of 185, and the property owner
brought an action of debt against the city to recover this amount. It
was held that the city could not escape liability on the ground -that the
street had never been actually opened. In 39th St., io W. N. C. 384 (x88i),
a report of viewers was held defective, which, inter alia, failed to set out
that the street had been opened or was about to be opened.
(3) The Act of April 1, 1864, P. L. 206, authorizes the jury of .iew
appointed to assess damages when any street in the City of Philadelphia is
ordered to be opened according to law also to make inquiry as to the.
advantages.
(4) The Act of May 6, 1887, P. L. 87, is unconstitutional except Sec-

tions i-and 2, whith-do not affect the question. Ruan Street, z32 Pa. 2s7
(i&o). In Volkmar. Street, 124 Pa. 320 (i88), there was a petition in
i888 by a property owner for the assessment of damages sustained by the
opening of'a street. The court below dismissed the proceeding on the
ground that the claim of the .property owner was barred by te statute
of limitations. not having been filed within six years from the date of
the order. The Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that there was no
act of opening the street, consequently no right accrued, and there was no
occasion to appoint viewers. The case arose undir a special act of Mare
6. i8-o. 7 Sm. L. -65. which in lact provided that no street shall be opened
until the owner, of the ground shall be compensated, and is, therefore, not
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indeed the learned judge who wrote the opinion does not seem
to have been aware that there were any statutes involved at
all. No possible ground upon which to support the decision
can be found. Even .if it might be regarded as overruling
Bush v. McKcesport, 81 as to the construction of the Act of
May i6, 1891,182 the grounds of decision are'no more valid,
because the Act of 1891, as we have pointed out,'8 5 does not
apply in Philadelphia, and the proceedings in the case were in
the Quarter Sessions and not in the Common Pleas.
The Supreme Court, however, in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Elkin, drew a distinction between the plotting of a street across
suburban or unimproved land, and across improved land in a
city. The learned judge said that in the former case the doctrine of the cases denying the owner the right to recover damages for a mere laying out was founded on equitable consideration and a wise public policy; on the contrary the cases were
decided on express statutory provisions.
Mr. Justice Elkin also said, that in the case of a laying out
of a street through urban property, particularly in the case of
the Parkway, different considerations were involved; thai it
was clear that the property of the petitioner was injured by the
laying out, and that the constitution conferred a remedy. The
learned judge then undertook to base the right to recover in
the proceedings before the court on the ground that, under certain circumstances, the right to recover might accrue even where
there was no ordinance to open, or no actual opening. The right
in point when considering proceedings under a general act. Williams, J.,
at 327, said: "Whether the owner might give notice of his intention to
abandon the land covered by the plotted street to the city and proceed to
have his damages ascertained and paid, is not now before us and we express, no opinion about it." Whittaker v. Phoenixville Boro, 141 Pa. 327
(iSgx), turned on the Act of April 22, 1856. P. L. 525, relating to boroughs.
The remarks of Green, J., therefore, as follows: "We decided that the
right of action to have damages assessed to the owner did not commence
until the opening of the street or the doing of some unequivocal act by the
city, which, indicated that the possession of the owner was about to be
disturbed," are to be confined to the act before the court.
In66 Pa. 57 (1895).
2 P. L 75
a
' See note 175 ante.
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might accrue under the constitution, but it could not accrue
under any statute relating to proceedings in the Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County to recover damages for the opening
of streets. 8 4 While, in this case, the conclusion reached was
probably the correct result, had the proceedings been in the
Common Pleas, under a proper act of assembly, the reasoning
is most unfortunate. Statutes do have a binding force although
there is a tendency, in the press of business, to shirk the labor
of examination 'vhen they are conflicting or obscure. 18
There is an unfortunate result of this decision, which is
producing grave injustice to the taxpayer, because of the Act of
June I, I915.180 The lower courts of Philadelphia County have
accepted the decision as authority for the proposition that the
ordinary laying out is a taking, and, in consequence, under this
act of assembly the property owner receives income from his
property, and, at the same time draws interest on the damages
from the public treasury. The taxpayer is now hit as. hard as
the property owner was before.
The laying out of a street is clearly not a taking but may
inflict damages, and the property owner would probably be entitled to such damages under the constitution entirely apart from
and irrespective of the damages which he might afterwards
recover when the actual taking occurs.
I See note i8o ante.
" This case overrules 'the case of In re the Widening of Venango
Street. 9 D. R. 651 (igoo), where a land owner, part of whose property was
within the lines of the street as widened on the city plan but not actually
opened, petitioned for the appointment of viewers. The City of Philadelphia answered that there was no taking and the petition was dismissed,
without a discussion of the statutes, the court saying that the Act of
December 27, 1871, P. L. (1872) x39o, applying to the City of Philadelphia,
and. in effect, depriving property owners of a right to recover damages for
the removal of buildings erected on the bed of the street after the laying
out. was not a taking of the land. The owner here built his improvements
on the line of the street and in fact abandoned the bed to the city. The
court, however, held that he was not compellable to abandon his lot. The
voluntary abandonment was not sufficient.
'OP. L. 685. This act provides that damages caused by a taking, injury
or destruction of private property shall bear interest from the date of such
taking, injury or destruction.
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Tu OF ACCRUAL OF ACTION.
The constitution provides that compensation must be made
or secured. It seems, therefore, that the compensation is payable before the injury is inflicted, and that the right of action
accrues at the same time; consequently, the property owner may
sue as soon as the work is actually undertaken at the point where
the injury is done.1"7
In case of injury by construction of sewer, the damages are
to be assessed as of the time of the completion of the sewer.1ss
In the case of a change of grade, the right of action against the
borough under the Act of May 24, 1878,1s9 accrues when the
work is done on the ground.11
"
Where, however, the construction of the works of the corporation is considered as a taking, and consequently the damages are to be assessed in statutory proceedings, the rule is
otherwise. Here the title is divested only by the filing of the
bond. Up to that time an action of trespass will lie for the
damages done. The damages are to be assessed as of the time
of the transfer of the title, to wit, the filing of the bond, and
in such cases, where the works are constructed prior to the
filing of the bond, the then owners have their remedy in an
action of trespass, the damages in which are not to be considered
'in the subsequent statutory proceedings.191
So also in case of proceedings under the Act of May 16,
1891,192 the owner of the abutting property at the time the
physical change is made, is entitled to damages and it is immanO'Brien v. Railroad Co., xi9 Pa. i84 (I888), action of trespass. The
abutting owner died after work commenced, and it was held the right of
action was in his executors. Railroad Co. v. Ziemer, z4 Pa. 56o (1880),
the heir and not the executor entitled to sue although route located and
staked before death of plaintiff's ancestor, who died before work was
actually begun.
'Chatham St., 16 Pa. Super. Ct. 1o3 (igox).

I"P.L zg.
'Jones v. Borough of Bangor, z44 Pa. 638 (1892).
Shevalier v. Telegraph Co., 22 Pa. Super. Ct. so6 (19o3).

1

"P. L 7S.
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terial that the fourth section of the same act authorizes the
appointment of viewers before or at any time after the taking
or injuring.1 9 '
SECURITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE

The constitutional provision specifies that the damages shall
be secured or paid for property injured or destroyed, and this
clause seems to apply as well to the injuries as to the taking.
The question then arises,-how far the property owner may
have security entered for property which is about to be injured.
The same rule applies here as in the case of eminent domain,
that is, that a public corporation, a municipality, or the state
need not give security as the power of taxation is adequate
security.19 '
Since the damages are in a measure consequential and sometimes impossible of calculation until after the work is done, it is
extremely difficult to settle properly the question of damages. In
one class of' cases, that is, of corporations in streets of cities
and boroughs, it seems to be clear that the only remedy the abutting owner has is by trespass for damages, and that he is not
entitled to security for damages, yet the c6nstitution seems
clearly so to provide in such a case.
NEGLIGENCE.

It remains only to point out that the liability for negligence is entirely unaffected by the principles we have just discussed and that such liability existed as well before the Constitution of 1874 as since. It has always been clear that damages
*sn re thirteenth Street, 38 Pa. Super. Ct. 263 (i9o9). In this case
there was a petition for viewers presented under the act by an owner who
subsequently parted with title before the work commenced. The owner
at the time the work commenced was held entitled to damages.
"In Delaware County's App., iio Pa. 159 (1888), an injunction against
the county commissioners was refused. The court said that the power of
taxationi bad been held sufficient in cases of taking and was clearly so in
cases of conseqitential damages. The rule was otherwise before the Constitution of 1874. Spangler's App., 64 Pa. 387 (1870); Confer, Faust v.
Railroad Company, 3 Phila. 164 (1858), s. c. 25 L. I. 221, where the injunction was refused.
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195
for negligence cannot be recovered in statutory proceedings.
It is frequently necessary, therefore, to distinguish the liability
for negligence from the liability for consequential damages. The
distinction appears to be as follows. Where the damage cannot
be averted by the exercise of due care, then it is the direct and
unavoidable consequence of the doing of the act and the subject
of redress under the heading of consequential damages. Where,
however, the damage can be avoided by. the exercise of due care,
then it is not the inevitable result of the doing of the act, but"
the result of the manner of doing it, and is the subject of redress
on the ground of negligence. This distinction is illustrated by
1 96 where the plaintiff claimed
the case of Stork v. Phiadclphia,
in statutory proceedings for damages to his house caused by
an excavation for a subway, which excavation removed the
lateral support of an adjoining lot. It was held that the plaintiff
could not recover as the injury resulted, according to his own
witnesses, from the manner of doing the work and his remedy,
therefore, was by an action of trespass for negligence.

SUMMARY.

For convenience, the principal headings of the discussion
may be summarized as follows:.
DAMAGES TO PROPERTY TAKEN.

(a) Where the whole tract is taken, the measure of damages is the market value at the time of taking, and the law is unaffected by the provisions of the Constitution of 1874.
(b) Where part is taken, the tract is considered as a whole,
and the damages to the part not taken, although strictly consequential, are recoverable both for construction and operation,
without negligence, under the measure of damages, which is the
difference between the market value of the whole tract before
'"Bridge Co. v. Coal & Nav. Co., 4 Rawle 9, 1832 (semble); Denniston
v. Phila. Co., x61 Pa. 41 (1874), S. c. i Pa. Super. Ct. 559 (1896); Stork
v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 101 (19oo); Line v. Railroad Company, 218 Pa.
6a4 (i9o7) semble.
MiN
9 5 Pa. xoi (xgoo).
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and the market value of the whole tract after the taking. The
Constitution 1874 had no effect on this case.' 9 7
DAMAGES TO PROPERTY IN VICINITY CAUSED BY OPERATION.
Where the damages to the property in the vicinty are- caused
by the operation of the works on the land taken, the law probably was, prior to the Constitution of 1874,198 that the adjoining owner could not recover in the absence of negligence.. In a
number of cases since 1874, the adjoining owner has failed to
recover, although the exact grounds of decision are not clear, 19
and in two recent cases the court seemed to lay down the rule
that there could be a recovery in the absence of negligence.2 0 '
It is apprehended that the true principle involved is this:
the power of eminent domain conferred by the legislature
makes the operation lawful and eliminates any aspect, of a nuisance at common law in the absence of negligence.-20
This rule
is not changed by Article 16, Section .8, of the Constitution of
1874, which imposes only a liability for damages caused by construction and enlargement and omits any reference to operation.
The doctrine recently introduced by the Supreme Court,
that there can be a recovery in the absence of negligence, seems
unsound and unsupported by reason or authority. 202
'"Watson v. Railroad Co. 37 Pa. 469 ('86i); Gilmore v. Railroad Co.,
io4 Pa. 275 (x883); Railroad Co. v. Hummel, 27 Pa. 99 (i856), and many
other cases.
'" Xo case on this point has been found.
'Action of trespass on the case: Railroad Company v. Lippincott, xz6
Pa. 472 (1887); Railroad Company v. Marchant, '19 Pa. 541 (1888); Dooner
v. Railroad Company, 142 Pa. 36 (x891); Wunderlich v. Railroad Company,
223 Pa. x14 (igog); Himmell v. Railroad Company, 175 Pa. 537 (1896);
Gilles v. Railroad Company, 226 Pa. 31 (i9o9); Ridgway v. Railroad Company, 244 Pa. 28Z.
Stokes v. Railroad Company, 214 Pa. 415 (1go6); Ganster v. Electric
Light CO, 214 Pa. 628 (i9o6).
I The power of eminent domain confers a right to locate anywhere
irrespective of the neighborhood, and that right would be impaired, if not
defeated, by permitting the adjoining owners to insist on their rights at
common law.
'
Where, however, there is no power of eminent domain, the corporation
is liable for maintaining a nuisance.' Trespass :- Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy, 39 Pa. 258 (i86i); Rogers v. Phila. Traction Co., 182 Pa. 473 (1897);
Hauck v. Pipe Line Co., 153 Pa. 366 (1893); Ganster v. Electric Light Co.,
214 Pa. 628 (i9o6).
Bill in equity: Stewart's App., 56 Pa. 413 (1867).
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DAMAGES TO LAND IN VICINITY CAUSED BY CONSTRUCTION AND
ENLARGEMENT.

Where the damage to the land in the vicinity is caused by
the construction of the works on the land taken, the adjoining
owner could not recover prior to 1874, in the absence of negligence.203 Since 1874 he may recover for damages caused by
construction and enlargement,20 4 under Article i6, Section 8, .of
the Constitution of 1874,205 irrespective of negligence, and since
no statute has been passed, the remedy is solely by an action of
trespass.
PUBLIC RIVE CASE.

The commonwealth owns the bed and waters of a public or
navigable river between low-water marks, and the riparian owner
has no title therein; consequently, anything done on the river
under grant from the commonwealth is a lawful act, and, prior
to the Constitution of 1874, neither the riparian owner 2o6 nor a
navigator 2 07 in the river could recover damages caused by anything done in the river under grant 2 08 from the commonwealth,
unless the liability was expressly imposed by act of the legislature,2 09 or there was negligence.
Railroad Company v. Young, 33 Pa. 175 (859); Canal Co. v. Mulliner,
68 Pa. 357 (1871).
'Fredericks v. Canal Co., 148 Pa. 317 (182); Crum v. Railroad Company, 226 Pa. 151 (191o).
'No .ase as to enlargement has been found.
'Zimmerman v. Union Canal Co, i W. & S. 346 (i84z), statutory
proceedings: Shrunk v. Xavigation Co., 14 S. & R. 71 (1826), statutory proceedings; Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. 21 (1869), 61 Pa. 3S (1870).
77 Pa. 310 ( 873), go Pa. 85 (879), actions on the case; Commonwealth v.
Fisher, x P. & W. 462 (183o). See remarks of Thayer, P. J., in Patent Y.
The Railroad Co., 14 W. N. C. 54., at 547 (1884); McKeen v. Canal Co.
49 Pa. 424 (1865), action on the case: Malone v. City, 2 Pa. 370 (.1892).
Monongahela ,Navigation Co. v. Coons. 6 NV. & S. io (1843), action on
the case.
I Monongahela Bridge Co. v. KY-; 46 Pa. 112 (1863); Clarke v. Bi'r- 17 (1861). See, however, remarks
mingham-Pittsburgh Bridge Co.. 4)
of Thayer, P. J., in Patent v. The . 'oad Company, 14 W. N. C. S4 at
547 (18S4).
"Hughes v. Heiser, I Binney 463 (i&89).
Dugan v. Bridge Co., 2 Pa. 3o3 (i8s6); Bacon v. Arthur, 4 Watts

437 (18S).
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The Supreme Court, however, placed the failure of the riparian owner to recover in these cases upon the supposed fact
that the damage was consequential, and therefore there was no
taking, and, in many cases, supposed that the commonwealth was
exercising the power of eminent domain in granting the use of
the public river.
Since the Constitution of 1874, a corporation, operating under grant from the commonwealth on a public river, having the
power of eminent domain, would be clearly liable for damage to
riparian property injured. No case has arisen, however, exactly
involving the point,2 10 and since no statute has been passed, the
remedy is by an action of trespass. In these cases if the corporation is merely given the right to operate on or occupy the
river, and there is no grant of the power of eminent domain,
Article x6, Section 8, would not apply. There is no authority,
however, for this proposition.
DAMAGES TO ABUTTING AND NoN-ABUTTING OWNERS BY
TURBANCE OF A PUBLIC HIGHWAY.

Dis-

Change of Grade.
There was no right of recovery before the Constitution of
1874, in the absence of statutory provision, for damages caused
by a change of grade 211 or by a private corporation.2 1 2 A change
of grade is a construction or enlargement of the works of a city,
borough or township, and frequently occurs in the construction
or enlargement of the works of a private corporation having the
power of eminent domain. Article 16, Section. 8, of the Constitution of 1874, therefore, applies and confers a right to recover
damages. - The remedy in the absence of statute is by an action
21 8
of trespass.
Where a statute has been passed, the remedy thereon is exRailioad Company v. Jones, i i Pa. 2o4 (i885); Butcher's Coal Co. v.
Phila.. i56 Pa. z4 (1893) ; Walnut Street Bridge, Philadelphia's App., 191 Pa.
153 (1899); Freeland v. Railroad Company, 197 Pa. 529 (19oz).
2"Green v. Borough of Reading. 9 Watts 382 0842); O'Conner v.
Pittsburgh, i8 Pa. 187 (185i) : In re Ridge Street, 29 Pa. 39! (1857).
"'Henry v. Bridge Co.. 8 W. & S. 85 (1844).
-'Plan 166. 143 Pa. 414 (i89); Groff v. Phila., i5o Pa. 594 (1892);
Hobson v. Phila., i5o Pa. 595 0892).
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clusive and trespass will not lie.2 14 The remedy is now exclusively conferred by the following statutes: Boroughs Act of
May 24, 1878,215 Cities Act of May x6, i89,2 tO Townships Act
of May 28, 1913.217 The non-abutting owner may recover if the
injury is proximate, immediate and substantial. 218 A number of
consequent upon
cases have arisen of change of grade of streets
21 the abolition of railroad grade crossings.
Corporationsin Highways.
Railroads are liable under the Act of February 19, 1849,20
to make compensation to an abutting owner for any damage
caused by an excavation or embankment in any street or alley in'
a city or borough made in the construction of the road, 221 and
the same statute 222 provides that the railroad may occupy the
whole of a country road upon constructing a new one in its
22 3
stead..
Borough of Beltzhoover v. Gollings, 1o Pa. 293 ( 1 982 ); White v.
Borough of MeKeesport, iot Pa. 394 (I882): McKee v. Pittsburgh, 7 Pa.
Super. Ct. 397 (1898). In Philadelphia, where the change occurred prior to
1874. the remedy was exclusively under the Consolidation Act of z854.
Schuler v. Philadelphia, 22 W. X. C. 161 (1888). See Philadelphia v.
Wright, 1oo Pa. 235 (1882).
"3P. L 129.

:P.L 75.
P. L 368. Townships were formerly exempt from liability because
not have the power of eminent domain. Wagner v. Salzburg Twp.,
they
did
.
1 32 Pa. 636 (180-): Shoe v.Township. 31 Pa. Super. Ct. 137

"Recovery:

(1896).

Mellor v. City, i6o Pa. 614 (1894); Chatham Street, 191

Pa. 6o4 (1899): Robbins v. Scranton. 217 Pa. 577 (1967) ; Walsh v. City of
Scranton, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 276 (1903) ; Haggerty v. Scranton, 23 Pa. Super.
Ct. 279 (19o3). Cf. O'Brien v. Railroad Company, .19 Pa. 184 (1888),

semble; change of grade of street by railroad company in constructing its
road.
Xo recovery: Ogontz Ave., 225 Pa. 126 (igog); Tucker Street, Plumb's
App., 166 Pa.336 (1895). Pittsburgh's Pet., Wilson and Snyder, etc., Co.'s
App., 247 Pa. 384 (1975).
"Tucker Street, Plumb's App., i166 Pa. 235 (1895); Phila., etc., Iron
Works v. Phila., 253 Pa. 6o (i916), affirming 24 D. R. 864 (1915) ; Keeling v.
Railroad Company, 205 Pa. 3i (i9o3).

P. L 7, Sec. io.
Railroad Co. Y. Rose, 74 Pa. 362 (1873); Railroad Company v. McChesney, 85 Pa. 522 (S878); Railroad v. Rhoadarmer, io7 Pa. 214 (1884);
Duke v.Railroad Company, 129 Pa. 422 (1889); Seipel v. Railroad Company, 129 Pa. 425 (1889).
"See. 13.
Sugar Creek Township v. Railroad Company, 242 Pa. 573 (1914).
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Where the railroad merely occupied the street with its
tracks, under authority of law, it was held that the company was
not liable in damages to the abutting owner in the absence of neg2 24
ligence on the ground that there was no additional servitude.
The Constitution of 1874, Article 16, Section 8, clearly
gives the abutting owner a right to recover damages caused by
the construction or enlargement of the works in the street irrespective of his ownership of the fee underlying the street, and as
no statute has been passed, the remedy is by an action of trespass. 225 Although this principle was uniformly. applied, the unfortunate notion that the abutting owner must have the underlying fee of the street in order to recover, has been adopted by
the Supreme Court.2 26 The adoption of this principle, which
now seems to be the law, is contrary to all the previous authorities, and, if carried to its logical conclusion, will nullify the constitution by denying the right to recover to an abutting owner
who does not own the fee to the bed of the street, and, at the
same time, has his right of access interfered with: It does not
clearly appear why such a useless principle should be adopted.
In the case of corporations other than railroads, a distinction has been drawn between a rural and an urban servitude,
without, however, assigning, any clear reason for the distinction.227 In the case of a country road, which is a rural serviPhila. & Trenton R. I Co., 6 Whart. 25 (i84o), statutory proceedings;
Mercur v. Railroad Company, 36 Pa. 99 (8.s) ; Faust v. Railroad Company,
3 Phila. 164 (858). s. c. 25 L 1. 2I, bill of abutting owner for an injunction dismissed. Snyder v. Railroad Co., 55 Pa. 340 (1867), statutory pro-ceedings; Struthers v. Railroad Company, 87 Pa. 282 (t874), trespass on
the case.
Railroad Company v. Patent, 17 W. N. 'C. 198 (1885); Railroad Company v. Duncan, iii Pa. 352 (1886); Railroad Company v. Walsh, 124 Pa.
c.4 (1889); Railroad Company v. Ziemar, 124 Pa. 56o (1889); Ralroad
Company v. McCutcheon, 18 W. N. C. 527/ (1886); Quigley v. Railroad Company, 121 Pa. 35 (1888).
'Jones v. Railroad Company, 15i Pa. 30 (1892); Willock v. Railroad
Company,
22223 Pa.
(909);
Company, 249 Pa. 245
(19z5), s. c.
D. 59o
R. 6582
(1914),Christy
24 D. v.
R. Railroad
4o (zi5).
I Nothing has been found in the books except the remarks of Mr. Justice
Dean in Dempster v. United Traction Co., 2o5 Pa. 70, at /8 (i93); see also
remarks of Rice. P. J., in Shinzel v. Telephone Co., 31 Pa. Super. Ct. 22i,

at 231 (x9o6), and of Green, J., in Wood v. McGrath, i5o Pa. 451, at 455,
4i seq. (1892).
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tude, the construction of the works of a corporation is considered an additional burden on the underlying fee, and the abutting owner is entitled to recover in statutory proceedings in eminent domain, 223 although permanent damages have been recov22
ered in an action of trespass.
No case has been found of an enlargement of the works. In
these cases an abutting owner is entitled to an injunction when
the construction has been begun without his consent or the filing.
230
of a bond.
In the case of an urban servitude, which is a street in a city
or borough, the works of the corporation do not impose an additional servitude, and the abutting owner is entitled to bring an
action of trespass and recover damages for any interference
with his access caused by construction and enlargement under
23 1
An injunction will not lie
the provisions of the constitution.
23 2
construction.
to restrain
In one case, however, where the court conceded the lawful
right of a telephone company to occupy the street, an injunction
was issued specifically controlling the location of a. pole in front
of plaintiff's lot in order to prevent irreparable injury to the lot
23 3
and the imposition of undue and unnecessary burdens thereon
The construction of a sewer in a street or road is not an
exercise of the power of eminent domain, and prior to the Constitution of 1874 the abutting owner had no right to recover
damages. The case is well within the wording of Article x6,
m'Tannehill v. Phila. Co., 2 Pa. Super. Ct. i5o (i8g6); Shevaljer v.
Telegraph Co., 22 Pa. Super. Ct. ;o6 (1903): Shuster v. Telegraph Co. 34
Pa. Super. Ct. 513 (19o7); Radnor Co. v. Electric Light Co, 208 Pa. 460
(1904).
*Hankey v Phila. Co.. 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 148 (897); Zanzinger v.
Electric Light Co., 6 D. R. 577 (1897). As to right of recovery against a
turnpike company, see Wenger v. Rohrer, 3 Pa. Super. Ct. 596 (1897).
"Dempster

v. Traction Co., 2o5 Pa. 70 (19O3).

Starr v. Traction Co.. 193 Pa. ;36 (89); Socket v. Norristown
Traction Co., 62 Pa. Super. Ct. 542 (1916).
mLockhart v. Rwy. Co., 139 Pa. 419 (189i); Rafferty v. Traction Co.,
147 Pa. 579 (1892): Dutton v. Railway Co., i Mont. Co. 4 (1885); Cooke v.
Telegraph Co.. 21 Pa. Super. Ct. 43 (1902); Faust v. Railroad Company,
3 Phila. 164 (1858), 25 L. 1. 221.
'Bartholomew v. Telephone Co., 29 Pa. C. C. R. 390 (i9o4).

280

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA L-IIV REVIEW

Section 8, and the remedy is now exclusive under the Act of
May 16, 1891.234 The city is not liable, in the absence of negligence, if the sewer is inadequate to carry off the water.2
The laying out of a street without an opening did not confer a right to recover damages prior to the Constitution of
1874, in the absence of statutory provision. 236 No case has
arisen of an action of trespass to determine whether the right to
recover damages is conferred by Article 16, Section 8, of the
Constitution of 1874. The Act of May 16, 1891 237 seems
clearly to confer the right. The Supreme Court, however, in an
ill-considered decision upon proceedings brought under this
act,2 38 overlooked its provisions and said, by way of dictum,
that there was no taking conferring a right to recover by Article
16, Section 8. This dictum was accepted by the profession and
no attempt was made to raise the question by bringing an action
of trespass. The legislature attempted to confer a remedy by
the obscure and clumsily worded Act of May 28, 1913,239 which
probably adds to the existing law only by directing juries of
view in street-opening cases to assess damages, if any are previously incurred, by the mere laying out without an opening.
The Supreme Court, in a case of proceedings in the Quarter
Sessions of Philadelphia County to recover damages for the
laying out of the Philadelphia Parkway without an opening,
decided that the petitioner was entitled to have a jury of view
appointed to assess damages, overlooking the express provision
of .the statutes in force relating to proceedings in the Quarter
Sessions, which statutes were not even referred to in the
opinion.2 40 The petition in the case relied on the Act of May 16,
:'P. L. 75. For the cases arising under the act, see note 53, ante.
-Baer v. City of Allentown, 148 Pa. 8o (892); Carr v. Northern

Liberties. 35 Pa. 324 (86o): Sullivan v. Pittsburgh. 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 357
(1897); Collins v. Philadelphia 93 Pa. 272 ('88o): Fair v.Philadelphia, 88
Pa 3o9 (i87o) : Bealafeld v. Borough of Verona. 188 Pa. 627 0898).. For

cases of negligence, see note 164. ante.
: District of City of Pittsburgh. 2 W. & S.320 (1841) ; Forbes Street,
70 Pa. 125 (87t), semble.
SP. L 2S.
Bush v. McKeesport, 166 Pa. 57 (1895).
P. L 368. for text see note 172. ante.
2
'0Phila. Parkway, 250 Pa. 257 (1915), reversing 24 D. R. 184 (i9x5).
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which was not applicable. 24' The decision cannot be
sustained on any possible ground, although the result reached
would be sound if the proceedings had been in the Common
Pleas under the Act of May x6, 189T,24 s or the Act of June 8,
1895.244 The distinction drawn in the case of laying out a street
over unimproved ground and over improved ground is not justified by any act of assembly or by the language of Article .i6,
Section 8, of tile Constitution of 1874.
Roland R. Foulke.
Philadelphia.
1891,241

P. L 75.
See note 175, ante.

P. L 75'P. L 18&.

